Does Aid Work?-for the MDGs by Dag Ehrenpreis
Poverty
International Poverty Centre October 2007
Does Aid Work?




Poverty in Focus is a regular publication of the
International Poverty Centre (IPC). Its purpose
is to present the results of research on poverty






Front page: A crate is unloaded from a
container ship on the collapsed quayside at the
Freeport of Monrovia, Liberia. The quay was
damaged when a boat carrying foreign aid
supplies crashed into it. The Freeport was
heavily contested throughout both of Liberia’s
civil wars. Photo by Tim A. Hetherington, Panos.
Editor’s note:  IPC acknowledges the roots of
the title of this issue as well as substantial
inspiration from the seminal book Does Aid
Work? by Professor Robert Cassen, London
School of Economics, Oxford U Press 1986 and
1994. We are grateful to all the authors for
generously contributing their intellectual
products without any monetary remuneration.
IPC is a joint project between the United Nations
Development Programme and Brazil to promote
South-South Cooperation on applied poverty
research. It specialises in analysing poverty and
inequality and offering research-based policy
recommendations on how to reduce them.
IPC is directly linked to the Poverty Group of the
Bureau for Development Policy, UNDP and





SBS – Ed. BNDES, 10º andar
70076-900 Brasilia   DF   Brazil
povertycentre@undp-povertycentre.org
www.undp-povertycentre.org
The views expressed in IPC publications are
those of the authors and do not necessarily
reflect the views of IPC, IPEA or UNDP.
Oscar Altimir, CEPAL, Santiago de Chile
Giovanni A. Cornia, Università di Firenze
Nora Lustig, Universidad Iberoamericana, Mexico
Gita Sen, Indian Institute of Management, Bangalore
Anna Tibaijuka, UN Habitat, Nairobi
Peter Townsend, London School of Economics
Philippe van Parijs, Université de Louvain
 I
n 2005, the G8 leaders promised to double aid to Africa and the UN World
Summit to increase total official development assistance (ODA) by around $ 50 bn.
a year by 2010 to reach at least 0.5 per cent of donor countries’gross national product
(GNP). The Summit recognised that such increases in ODA were required for achieving
the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).
Aid volume targeting is not new; even in 1970 the UN set the ODA target of 0.7 per cent of
the GNP of each economically advanced country, so far met by only five donor countries.
The announcements of sharp increases in aid to developing countries have not been
received only with cheers all around. An intense debate is taking place on whether this
is the right road to take, considering the perceived macroeconomic risks and the large
amounts of aid that have already been provided during several decades, while massive
poverty persists in developing countries. The aid critique and the signs of political
‘aid fatigue’ have intensified in recent years; many point to free trade and private
investment as better options.
Yet, the decades of ODA have seen the largest poverty reduction in the history of
mankind. The evidence indicates mostly that aid has contributed significantly to this,
both via its impact on economic growth and through more direct interventions for
human development (see page 10).
In this issue of Poverty in Focus, various features of the current international aid system
are discussed critically and constructively, with references to recent research literature
on aid effectiveness and sharing of important and policy-relevant results.
Roger C. Riddell summarises his new book explaining why the current aid system is
no longer fit for purpose and needs a radical overhaul. He provides a sketch of an
alternative as a basis for discussion.
Stephen Browne aims his critique at the traditional volume targeting of aid and at its
supply-driven mode, proposing a shift of focus to human development at country level.
Nancy Birdsall focuses on the impact of aid on the middle class, including skilled
workers. She advocates reforms of aid to reduce its risk of undermining weak
institutions in aid-dependent Africa.
Finn Tarp reviews the evidence from aid effectiveness studies and finds the single most
common result to be that aid has had a positive impact on per capita income growth.
Edward Anderson discusses how different principles for allocating aid across countries affect
global MDG achievement, involving a trade-off between equity and effective use of aid.
Patrick Guillaumont argues that aid is most effective as volatility insurance in the
poorest and most vulnerable countries, where it helps pro-poor growth by
stabilising the economy.
Rainer Thiele et al. examine the large variations across donors in the sector targeting of
aid, especially in the share of social sectors that are key to achieving most of the MDGs.
David Goldsbrough and Ben Elberger find that IMF conditionality has unduly constrained aid
spending in poor countries in favour of using aid for reducing debt rather than poverty.
John Serieux stresses that such a response to the fear of Dutch disease is unjustified,
since many countries have shown that aid surges can be managed and used for its
intended purposes.
Terry McKinley shows that such fears have meant that only about a quarter of disbursed
aid to Africa was actually spent as intended; the lion’s share went into reserves and
debt buy-backs.
Pierre Jacquet analyses the aid grants vs. loans issue in the light of the resolution of the
debt crisis of poor countries, supporting the use of modernised models of ODA loans.
Jan Cedergren reports on the response by development cooperation partners to the many
challenges of aid effectiveness and on the intensive reform process and its monitoring.
May these articles contribute to the ongoing analytical and policy debate on aid
effectiveness and thus to the changes in aid modalities and procedures that are most
likely to enhance advancement towards the MDGs.Poverty In Focus   October 2007    3
If the international community is
serious about wanting to improve the
effectiveness of aid, it would focus its
attention principally on addressing the
central systemic problems which
continue to impede the greater impact
of official development assistance (ODA).
Today’s system of raising, allocating and
deploying official aid remains effectively
the same as that created more than 50
years ago. Especially in relation to the
poorest countries, this system is no
longer fit for purpose.  It needs to be
radically overhauled.
International conferences at which
donors jointly pledge to increase their
aid—and international organisations’
statistics on the total amount of aid
given and the share of ODA to gross
national income (GNI)—create the
impression of common purpose, joint
action and shared goals. The reality is
sharply different as the following
characteristics of the aid ‘system’
strikingly show.
Aid is provided by individual donors on
an entirely voluntary basis. Each donor
chooses and determines itself how much
aid it will give. Repeated pledges at
international conferences and summits
to increase official aid are not binding
on donor countries. No sanctions are
imposed on countries which fail to
honour their promises, only mild criticism
in the peer reviews of OECD’s
Development Assistance Committee
(DAC), which they are at liberty to ignore.
There is no clear and predictable link
between the overall amounts of aid
provided and the aggregate aid needs,
though the crude and partial
assessments made suggest a huge gap.
Hence, the potential impact of aid is
reduced because insufficient aid is
provided. Indeed, there is no necessary
relationship between the aid requirements
of individual poor countries and
the amount of aid each receives.
To qualify as ODA, official aid funds
must have the promotion of economic
development and welfare as their main
objective. However, ODA continues to be
influenced by the commercial, strategic
and short-term political interests of
donors, reducing the share of aid to the
poorest countries and raising its costs.
A major consequence is the extreme
volatility in the flow of aid funds to
particular countries. Recipients do not
know whether the aid they will receive
this year will continue to be provided
five, three or even one year hence, and
historical experience confirms that the
amounts provided vary markedly from
year to year. Aid volatility makes
recipients extremely reluctant even to
spend the aid they receive, particularly
on recurrent costs, reducing still further
its potential impact.
Nearly seven years after the UN
Millennium Summit there has yet
to be a country case where aid is being
significantly scaled up to support a
medium-term programme to reach the
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs),
as the World Bank  pointed out in the
Global Monitoring Report 2007.
Aid effectiveness is severely reduced
by the growing complexity of donor-
recipient relationships. Today, there are
over 200 official donor agencies, more
than double the number 40 years ago,
and the numbers continue to rise.
At least 30 recipient countries must
deal with more than 40 donors.
Why does official aid continue to be
provided in ways which seriously impede
its potential impact? The answer lies in
history. For more than 50 years, most
aid-giving has been determined by the
by Roger C. Riddell,
Oxford Policy Management
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The international aid system
is no longer fit for purpose,
especially in relation to the
poorest countries. It needs
to be radically overhauled.
Aid is still influenced by the
commercial, strategic and
political interests of donors,
reducing the share of aid to
the poorest countries and
raising its costs.
Aid is needed most in
precisely those countries
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issues and encourage
further discussion
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decisions of individual donors. In
recent years, this approach has been
complemented by what could be termed
the international co-operative approach,
led by the United Nations and the OECD/
DAC, both concerned at the large gap
between aid’s impact and its potential.
However, in relation to the list of
problems just outlined, both the scope
and pace of reform of the aid system have
been extremely limited.
In its 2005 Human Development Report,
UNDP argued that “fixing the international
aid system is one of the most urgent
priorities facing governments… “. The
main focus of attention needs to be the
world’s poorest countries, those whose
need for aid is the greatest. The following
comprise the core building blocks of an
aid system for the poorest countries in
tune with the core principles of our
contemporary world:
a) The acceptance by all nation states, but
particularly by the wealthier nations, of
the obligation to provide assistance
independent of their own commercial
strategic and short-term political interests,
and channelled to those countries unable,
on their own, to ensure the fundamental
rights, basic needs and core freedoms of
their own citizens.
b) Compulsory contributions by the rich
countries, provided on the basis of their
relative wealth, and pooled into an aid
fund of a size sufficient to meet the total
aid needs of the poorest countries, based
on the aggregate assessments of their
individual aid requirements. Aid funds
from such a common pool would be
channelled to each of the poorest
countries to help meet their needs and
address the financial, skills and other
requirements upon which the assessment
of aid needs was based.
The main challenge in creating such a
system lies less in agreeing its broad
principles and core building parameters
and far more in debating and agreeing
precisely how a workable system might
be established, and to gain the support
of all nation states, both donor and
recipient governments. Here, the
greatest hurdle is unlikely to be the
switch from voluntary to compulsory
donations or the distancing of
aid-to-the-poorest from the commercial
and short-term political interests of
the donors. Rather, it is likely to hinge
on the confidence of the main donor
governments that the recipient countries
accessing aid funds from the common
pool will make good use of the aid funds
provided. This issue goes to the heart of
the following twin paradoxes of aid:
Aid is needed most in precisely those
countries which are least able to use it
well. The less unfavourable the context
into which aid funds are channelled, the
higher the likelihood that donors will
wish to apply a range of conditions to try
to ensure that ‘their’ aid funds are well
spent.  However, the impact of aid tends
to be linked directly to the commitment
and capability of the recipient to use it
well, and the greater the degree and
intensity of conditionality applied by the
donors, the more recipients are likely to
feel that they are not in control, so they
will be less committed to ensuring the
funds are used as effectively as possible.
Many wise women and men have
grappled with these issues over the more
than five decades that official aid has
been provided. Based largely on their
work, the following clusters of inter-
related proposals provide the basic ideas
for how current aid relationships might
be altered, most especially to address
the core paradoxes of aid and the
tensions surrounding aid conditionalities.
These proposals are presented in order
to focus attention on the key issues,
and encourage further discussion of
a different aid system.
A new International Development Aid
Fund (IDAF) for the poorest countries
should be established. The monies to be
raised for the operation of the Fund
would equal the total amount of (official)
development aid required by each
qualifying poor country. The resources
required would be funded by compulsory
contributions made by each of the world’s
wealthiest countries, with the amounts
contributed by each determined by their
relative wealth.
IDAF funds would be earmarked for, but
not initially allocated to each qualifying
recipient country in relation to their aid
requirements. In order, particularly, to
satisfy donor governments that the funds
were being spent as well as possible, a
new International Aid Office (IAO) should
be established, whose roles and
responsibilities would include overseeing
and ensuring the effective functioning of
IDAF. While, ideally, the establishment
of the IAO would be based on a ‘balanced’
agreement between the governments of
donor and poor countries, what is crucial
is that it be created with the full support
of donor governments, otherwise—
as discussed below—donors would be
unlikely to support the new mechanisms
for overseeing the spending of aid funds.
On the basis of consultations with each
recipient country and with key donors,
the IAO would determine which of two
possible ways these earmarked funds
would be disbursed: (i) if the IAO was
satisfied that a qualifying poor country
government had the commitment,
competence and capacity to use the
Is aid effective and focused on poverty reduction?
The 63 poorest countries of the world receive less than half of total ODA.
Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan received less than two per cent of all ODA in 1999; this
share rose to a quarter of all ODA in 2005, a thirty-fold increase.
Aid tying is estimated to add over 20 per cent to the costs of providing aid, amounting
today to some $7 bn.
Most aid is still managed by donors: less than 40 per cent is disbursed through recipient
government channels; half of all multilateral aid is earmarked for particular uses; and only
a third of aid provided by UN aid agencies is aligned to national priorities.
In 2005, the number of separate aid transaction recorded , in aggregate, by all official aid
agencies was estimated at 60,000—three times the number less than ten years ago—
while the average size of each transaction has progressively fallen.Poverty In Focus   October 2007    5
aid funds effectively, it would allocate
the earmarked funds directly to the
recipient government; (ii) if the IAO
had doubts about the commitment,
competence or capacity of the recipient
government to use the aid funds
effectively, a National Aid Implementation
Agency (NAIA) would be established
for the purpose of allocating and
overseeing the spending of aid funds
earmarked for the country by the IDAF.
As its name suggests, the NAIA would be
national—recipient country-based—and
not a donor aid agency. Its operations
would be overseen by a group of eminent
and competent recipient country
nationals, drawn from a cross-section of
society, including civil society, and staffed
by a mix of nationals and international
staff as required to ensure aid funds
are spent well, in an accountable and
transparent way. It is likely that in many
poor countries and fragile states, funds
would be channelled into training and
technical support as needed.
Why would a poor country government
agree to ‘its’ aid funds being overseen
by the NAIA? For two principle reasons:
firstly, because otherwise it would not
receive official aid funds; and secondly,
because a significant share of the aid
which passes through the NAIA is highly
likely to end up in state-based projects
and programmes.
The IAO would play the key role
in assessing whether the NAIA was
competent to allocate and monitor
the use of the funds provided,
and, where necessary, it would draw
on international expertise, usually on
a temporary basis, to provide support
to NAIA—the channelling of aid into
a common pool and IAO approval for
the NAIA removing the requirement
now made by donors to apply their own
conditions to the aid they individually
provide. The IAO would also be
responsible for ensuring that reviews
of the status of each recipient country
take place, and would be open to
representations from parliamentary,
civil society or other groups from
recipient countries, and from donors,
who have substantive concerns that aid
funds are not being used as effectively
as they might.
If individual donors wanted to provide
aid to recipient countries additional to
that provided through the auspices of the
IDAF, they would be at liberty to do so,
provided recipients were willing
to accept such aid, and any conditions
attached to its provision. It would be
up to the relevant donors and recipients
themselves, and no one else, to
determine how to make use of the
aid funds offered.
Under these proposals, both recipient
country governments and, where
applicable, the different NAIAs
established in aid recipient countries
would be encouraged to make use of
and draw directly upon the skills and
experiences currently residing in
existing aid agencies, international
financial institutions and aid
consultancy firms to assist in ensuring
that aid funds are effectively used.
Any supportive technical assistance
provided would normally be contracted
on the basis of a transparent tendering
process. Both recipient governments
and NAIAs would be at liberty to
contract either one, or a number of
donor agencies to manage and oversee
the use of all, or part of a recipient
country’s aid programme, provided the
agency was willing to sign such aid
contracts and accept the conditions
laid down by the recipient country
government or NAIA. The figure
illustrates what an aid structure based
on these initial ideas might begin to
look like in countries where a NAIA was
deemed necessary.
These proposals should be viewed more
as a vision of what a different aid system
might begin to look like, and not as a
blueprint for immediate implementation.
Their principal purpose is to stimulate
discussion of what might be. The most
important proposal is for nation states
to begin the serious discussion of how
the aid system could change, and
no longer continue to park such
discussions in their ‘far too difficult’
pending trays.
Repeatedly over the past decades
statesmen and women and international
commissions and scholars have called for
a radical reform to the current aid system
replacing it with one which is fit for
purpose. For too long, politicians have
avoided facing head-on the challenges
involved in trying to change the aid
system. They need to be encouraged, or
shamed, into trying, if they really believe
that extreme poverty is the most serious
form of human rights violations in the
world today and requires urgent
attention. For, as all donors agree, aid
can contribute to making a difference—
if it is provided in ways which seek to
maximise its impact.
R. Riddell: Does Foreign Aid Really Work?
Oxford: Oxford University Press 2007.
http://www.oup.com/uk/catalogue/
?ci=97801992956546 International Poverty Centre
Traditional targeting of aid
levels follows a false scent
in development terms.
Supply-driven aid is worth
less, driven by the instincts
of rich country politicians
and donor self-interest.
Aid has more meaning and
legitimacy when it is focused
on human development
outcomes at country level.
Donors should reduce
the harmful effects of
conditioned aid and
distorted trade, while
creating a more propitious
global environment.
Two years ago at Gleneagles, the G8
countries promised to double their aid to
Africa. Since then, they have written off
a substantial part of the external debt to
the largest and oil-richest country, Nigeria.
But new aid to the continent has stayed
flat. In 2006, while Europe increased its aid,
the two largest G8 economies, USA and
Japan, reduced theirs. Africa, quite rightly,
commands the growing attention of
donors. But aid amount targets, both
for Africa and globally, are often missed.
Does that matter?
This article makes four propositions:
(i) traditional aid amount targeting is
following a false scent in development
terms; (ii) supply-driven aid has
questionable value; (iii) aid should be
more concerned with genuine country-
based development goals; and (iv) rich
countries should use aid as a means of
facilitation, not as patronage.
Targeting aid amounts is nothing new. In
1970, the UN set the target of 0.7 per cent
of rich countries’ Gross NationaI Product
(GNP) for Official Development Assistance
(ODA). Since then a growing number of
donor countries have stated their
intention to reach it1. The main purpose
for setting such targets for aid is to create
and sustain a momentum for ODA. While
most donors haven’t met the target, many
have agreed that they should increase
assistance to the poor countries. For the
politicians of the rich countries and their
constituents, therefore, aid volume
targeting plays a useful role in reminding
governments of their obligations. The
two largest donors, however—USA and
Japan—are exceptions.
But apart from providing momentum,
what does such targeting really mean?
Is it based on a realistic estimation of
the resources actually required for
development? When it was first set,
development—often equated with
economic growth—was supposed
to depend mainly on capital, which
developing countries lacked and the
developed countries could supply. Today,
there is no such developmental basis, for
various reasons.
First, the resources represented by the
target in 1970 would be a very different
—and a much smaller—percentage
today. Even if we include private external
finance, as in the previous 1 per cent target,
it was exceeded many years ago; total
private foreign direct investment flows
from North to South are several times
greater than ODA.
Secondly, even if we still imagined that
development depended critically on
external resource transfers, there are many
sources besides aid: export proceeds and
remittances from abroad, for example,
which have grown appreciably.
Third, experience long ago confounded
the facile assumption that more
resources resulted automatically in more
development. If that were true, then just
based on oil revenues, Angola and Nigeria
would already be advanced countries,
whereas they rank 159th and 161
st out of
177 countries on the human development
scale. As the Center for Global
Development puts it (Working Paper 68):
“the 0.7 per cent target was calculated
using a series of assumptions that are no
longer true, and justified by a model that
is no longer considered credible.”
A fourth reason for questioning the
correlation between aid and development
derives from the quality of aid itself.
There is a growing body of evidence that
traditional forms of development aid do
not make a major difference. If volume
targets only help to ratchet up the same




International Trade Centre, Geneva
1. Only five countries have done so: Norway,
Sweden, Denmark, Netherlands and Luxembourg.Poverty In Focus   October 2007    7
development will not result. Here are
some of the distortions, which are related
to the supply-driven nature of aid:
 Most aid is administered by
many large and expensive public
bureaucracies each with procedures
of their own.
 Supply is excessive, duplicative
and pre-financed.
 Recipient countries are chosen
according to the instincts of northern
politicians and donor self-interests.
 The content and terms of aid are
strongly influenced by the needs
and interests of the suppliers rather
than the recipients, and the solutions
do not stick.
Foreign solutions are not fully absorbed.
More often they are grafted on to local
institutions without strengthening them
from within. Or they remain as enclaves.
The proliferation of donor-funded
‘project implementation units’ provides
widespread evidence of these grafts.
Such PIUs are there to ensure that the
donors’ projects are carried out to donor
specifications. They employ foreign and
local staff who are remunerated at levels
well above local scales. When the project
has run its course, the PIUs disband
leaving little behind in terms of
sustainable capacity. Enclaves are similar.
They include, for example, some of the
withering fruits of capital assistance:
empty schools and hospitals, crumbling
highways and silted dams.
More valid targets for donors would be
the eight Millennium Development Goals
to which the international community
unanimously signed up at UN summits
in 2000 and 2005. The first seven goals
relate to poverty reduction, education,
health, HIV/AIDS, gender equality and
the environment. They can be applied
at the country-level since they specify
proportionate improvements in standards
by the year 2015, e.g. halving national
income poverty rates. The eighth goal
relates to donor responsibilities to
facilitate the other seven.
The merits of the MDGs are the obverse
of the flaws of global aid volume targeting.
The MDGs are measures of progress in
human development, albeit partial ones.
They are about development ends, rather
than crude aggregates of financial means.
They are relatively easy to measure
and there are data available on them
for most countries.
Aid has more meaning and legitimacy
when it is focused on human
development outcomes at country level.
Rather belatedly, the development
community is recognizing the wisdom of
national plans and strategies which help
to map paths towards the achievement
of MDGs, taking into account the
individual circumstances of each country.
The proponents of aid volume targeting
want to calculate ‘MDG financing gaps’
again using the facile assumption that
aid can somehow miraculously purchase
development ends. The MDGs are the
right focus, but aid—on condition that it is
the right kind of aid—will be only one of
the many, many conditions that need to
be in place if development is to progress.
Beyond traditional aid, the rich countries
need to show a stronger commitment to
development. That would mean easing
some of the impediments which they
place—or continue to perpetuate—on
developing countries.
First, they could forgive more debt.
For the poorest countries this should
mean wiping out external indebtedness
entirely, and not lending more either
bilaterally or through the multilateral
system, such as the World Bank.
External funding should be in grant
form and should be used to finance
mutually approved programmes aimed at
promoting growth and meeting human
needs, including the Millennium
Development Goals.
Second, they could facilitate global trade
by demantling the barriers in the way of
exports from the poorest countries. There
is much talk of ‘aid for trade’ these days,
but still developing countries face unfair,
heavily subsidised competition and high
tariffs on their exports of goods to which
they try to add value.
The so-called ‘donor’ countries collect
much more in import tariffs from
developing countries than they provide
in aid. For example, the USA in 2006
imported $37 billion from France and
collected $367 million in tariff revenues;
it collected exactly the same amount of
tariff revenues from Cambodia from $2
billion of imports. The USA collected
similar tariff amounts from the UK and
from Bangladesh, although the former’s
imports were worth seventeen times as
much. And while global trade rules try
to prevent developing countries from
subsidising their farmers, agricultural
protection in the richest countries still
runs at about three times the level of
annual ODA, viz. $300 billion.
In addition to lifting these impediments,
rich countries could do more to finance
and propagate global public goods,
which poor people in developing
countries need more than hand-outs.
More funds should go into vaccines
and medicines against the diseases that
attack millions of children and adults.
The Global Fund for AIDS, Tuberculosis
and Malaria (GFATM)—three diseases
which kill 6 million people per year in the
developing world—needs more funds, as
does the Global Alliance for Vaccines and
Immunization (GAVI) to reduce mortality.
Theirs are meaningful targets, because
they lead to monitorable results. Other
public goods could help eliminate the
public ‘bads’ of conflict and violence,
trafficking of people, drugs, small arms
and landmines.
There is also a rapidly mounting
concern for responsible environmental
management to turn back global
warming, the most deleterious
consequences of which will fall
on the poorest countries. Funds are
needed to accelerate the development
and deployment of technological
solutions which will wean the world
from hydrocarbons.
If donors want to do more good for the
world, they need to review their broader
development footprint: reducing the
harmful effects of conditioned aid and
distorted trade, while creating a more
propitious global environment.
Traditional aid targeting won’t cut it.
S. Browne: Aid and Influence: Do Donors
Help or Hinder? Earthscan, 2006.
http://shop.earthscan.co.uk/ProductDetails/
mcs/productID/587/groupID/7/
categoryID/7/v/28 International Poverty Centre
The donor community is not unaware of
the constraint to effective aid of weak
institutions of the state, including in
Africa. Indeed much of the discussion
of increasing aid to Africa has been in
the context of a ‘compact’ in which more
aid from donors would be matched by
increased attention to ‘good governance’
by recipient governments.
Countries where average incomes are
low because long-run growth rates have
been low can easily be identified and also
what aid should pay for: infrastructure
and social investments that a country is
too poor to finance itself. Identifying the
countries that are victims of a WIT is not
so straightforward. Growth is a poor
indicator since there is probably some
lag between an improvement in
institutions and subsequent growth, and
since recent growth is a poor proxy for
adequate institutions given the frequent
growth reversals after periods of growth
accelerations. Moreover, absent an ex ante
definition of what constitutes weak
‘institutions’—or how these can be
strengthened—it is not clear what
aid should pay for.
There is strong research evidence
that institutions, variously described,
matter for growth. The problem is that
‘institutions’ covers many rules, habits,
customs, cultural and social factors and
more; the state of a country’s institutions
is harder to describe let alone measure
than is the extent of its poverty. The links
from specific policy actions or aid
programs to the institutional outcomes
they measure are complex; it is hard to
differentiate among the many
institutions—rule of law, control of
corruption, free press—that might
matter now for subsequent growth, nor
explain how changes in institutional
strength in a country may affect
subsequent growth.
Donors’ implicit assumption is that
Africa is stuck in a poverty trap and that
massive aid is necessary to escape
from the trap. I suggest an alternative
assumption: that Africa is caught in an
institutional trap, signaled and reinforced
by the small share of income of its
independent middle-income population.
Theory and historical experience
elsewhere suggest that a robust
middle-income group contributes
critically to the creation and sustenance
of healthy institutions. If external aid is
to be helpful for institution-building in
Africa’s weak and fragile states, donors
need to emphasise not providing more
aid but minimising the risks more aid
poses for this group in Africa.
The key to understanding Africa’s
poor long-run growth record—and
limited poverty reduction—may be the
weakness of its ‘institutions’, including
its institutions of the state. With neither
the institutional structure that provides
sufficient ‘autonomy’ from interest groups
nor the democratic arrangements and
habits that make the state accountable to
the citizens, the state in many African
countries fails to protect
the property rights—except of the few
insiders—that sustain productive private
investment and risk-taking; indeed in the
worst cases the state actually abuses
the property rights of citizens.
Thus, rather than a poverty trap I would
call this a ‘weak-institutions trap’—a WIT!
The poverty trap idea supports an
emphasis on increasing the quantity of aid
as the key to sustained growth. The idea of
a weak-institutions trap, and the failures
of past aid programs that led to high
debt burdens without growth in many
countries, supports emphasis on the
quality of aid, including the nature of aid
programs and their impact on political and
other institutions in the recipient country.
by Nancy Birdsall,
Center for Global Development Do No Harm: Aid and the
Missing Middle in Africa





The state in many cases




Donors need to avoid
harm to the fragile middle
that fuels growth and
strong, accountable
democratic institutions.
The impact of volatile aid
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In short, we have no reasonably
predictive measure of a country’s
institutions and thus its WIT status.
But recent political and economic
theories of the role of state institutions
in growth suggest possible current
indicators that combined with the
systematic measures of governance
should be warning signs.
Among likely underlying causes of
a country’s suffering a WIT are:
 Heavy dependence on mineral and
oil exports, leading to Dutch disease
and limited investment in human
capital, high income inequality,
limited creation of productive jobs,
and little state accountability to the
majority of citizens.
 Low natural openness; landlocked,
limited access to the sea and non-
trading neighbours. That reduces
opportunities for trade and
thus for export-driven growth.
 Problematic borders combined with
ethnic heterogeneity, which together
undermine the legitimacy of the state.
Among symptoms of a WIT likely to
reinforce such causes are: Primary
commodity dependence and associated
economic volatility, recent experience of
conflict and/or current inability of the
state to effectively control all of its own
territory, low non-trade tax revenues,
prevalent corruption, and lack of
executive accountability.
Some evidence suggests an additional
salient indicator: an unequal distribution
of income with a small ‘middle’, i.e. where
the 60 per cent of households in middle
receive a small proportion of national
income. This should more systematically
affect decisions about the amount of
aid a country can absorb, and the type
of aid that makes sense.
Most middle-income households in Africa
are actually poor by international
standards, or at risk of becoming poor.
While maintaining their concern for the
‘poor’ as conventionally defined, donors
need also to avoid harm to the fragile
‘middle’. Of special concern should be the
implications of high and unpredictable aid
inflows for small entrepreneurial activity
and job creation in the private sector.
In the more than 20 countries already
highly dependent on aid—where aid
constitutes 10 per cent or more of GNP
and as much as 50 per cent of total
government spending—donors and
recipient governments should monitor
more closely the effects of aid and of
planned aid increases on the labour
market, particularly for skilled
workers; on interest rates and other
macroeconomic variables; on domestic
investor confidence, given the volatility
of past aid; and on incentives for
domestic revenue generation.
Many countries in Africa that are highly
dependent on aid have the symptoms of
a weak-institutions trap. Strengthening
their local institutions, particularly state
institutions, is key to their sustaining
growth. Proposals for reform of aid to
make it compatible with institution-
building exist. But even in the case of
‘capacity development’—the first and
often last resort of donors—caution is
warranted given the failures of the past.
In the end experience suggests that the
institution-building process is a local
task; it is not particularly amenable to
outside help.
A first step for donors is to reduce the
risk that aid from outside undermines
existing and incipient institutions.
Broad reforms of aid practice would
help—harmonisation would reduce
poaching, and greater predictability
would avoid the volatility that
discourages domestic investment.
But ambitions and rhetoric about
broad donor reform are way ahead
of the reality of how donors actually
now behave. Donor reforms may yet
take hold, but in what may be a long
‘meantime’ official donors active in
aid-dependent countries ought to
focus on a more modest goal: while
doing good for the poor, do not do harm
the productive middle. After all, in the
advanced economies and in developing
countries that have sustained growth
for several decades, it is the productive
‘middle’ that not only fuels sustained,
private sector growth but provides the
ballast of accountable, democratic and
strong state institutions. 
Nancy Birdsall: Do No Harm: Aid, Weak
Institutions, and the Missing Middle in
Africa. Center for Global Development




... is a proposed hands-off approach to scaling up foreign aid that would explicitly
be aimed at strengthening local capacity and institutions, including in fragile states.
It would link additional aid to clear evidence of progress already achieved on the
ground. This approach would give flexibility and autonomy to local institutions,
providing an opening for experimentation, while at the same time ensuring that aid
pays only for real, measurable achievements. Donors would bind themselves as a group
to pay a specific amount for clear evidence of progress against one or more agreed
goals in low-income developing countries.
Developing country governments would present an independently audited statement
reporting their progress on the measures, and donors would pay the agreed amount.
Payments would be determined as a function of the outcomes, and not linked to the
implementation of any particular policies, any other intermediate outputs, or ‘tied’
to purchases from particular suppliers or companies. Governments that found ways to
provide services efficiently and so reduce the costs of providing them would benefit
from a larger surplus. Such an approach raises issues in setting the benchmarks against
which progress is measured, in avoiding cheating, and in managing unintended
negative consequences of an incentives-based approach. But it entails important
advantages for both donors and recipients.
Owen Barder and Nancy Birdsall: Payments for Progress: A Hands-Off Approach to
Foreign Aid. Center for Global Development Working Paper No. 102, December 2006.






Looking for stable and
predictable impacts of
aid on growth and
development is no
simple task.
A careful review of the
evidence indicates a
positive impact overall,
but aid alone will not
turn the wheels of history.
‘Good policy’ can be a
misleading criterion
for aid allocation, and
simplistic rules-of-thumb
may make things worse.
There is much to
criticise in current aid
practices, but a lot of
progress is being made.
Foreign aid remains squarely on most
policy agendas concerned with growth,
poverty and inequality. Yet controversy
about aid impact is rampant. This is not
surprising. Even a cursory look at history
shows that development over the past 50
years has been a complex and variegated
process. There have been interrelated
changes in resource accumulation,
population, knowledge and production
technology—all in the context of frequent
and dramatic change in policies and
institutions. Looking for stable and
predictable impacts of foreign aid on
growth and development is no simple
task under such circumstances. Analysts
and policymakers are well advised to be
wary of the dangers of oversimplification.
In particular, one cannot conclude
that aid has been a fiasco just because
growth in Africa has been less than
desired, or because some development
projects have failed. Development is,
and will always be, a risky business.
Unsuccessful investment projects and
public sector activities abound in even
the best of political, social and economic
circumstances. If all investments were
successful, investors are likely to have
been too risk-averse.
Serious aid impact analysis must (i) try
harder to uncover whether foreign aid
has on average had a positive impact
on development in recipient countries
or not; and/or (ii) identify the
mechanisms through which aid impacts
e.g. on growth, including all potential
positive and negative effects. A recent
paper (see end-reference) reviews the
evidence on whether aid has been
effective in furthering economic
growth and development.
It is easy to find a negative association
between aid and growth in simple
correlation analysis. Yet, there is no
inconsistency between little growth and
low aid inflows. Over the past decade
the mode of annual aid per capita in
recipient countries amounted to less
than $20 and the median was under
$35. Moreover, the simple correlation
coefficient between growth and aid
may be insignificant, or even negative,
because donors allocate more aid to
poorer countries, subject to difficulties
and shocks of many kinds, including
natural and man made calamities. When
countries have done well for a while so
average income has gone up, donors
tend to transfer less aid and eventually
they withdraw. While such ‘graduation’
may take a while, simple correlations
are thus likely to show a negative
relationship, but they do not reveal
the ‘true’ impact of aid.
Aid allocation matters, as does the
major changes that have taken place
in the global economy and affected
the environment in which aid is
implemented. Targets for aid have
also been changing from one decade
to the next. Hence, simple correlation
analysis or story telling cannot—and
should not—settle the causality
debate about aid’s potential impact
on development.
Similarly, it is never straightforward to
generalise from case studies; this helps
explain the surge of macroeconomic
cross-country studies of the aid-growth
link from the mid-1990s. Such an
approach makes it possible to move
beyond simplistic aid-growth
correlations, where the analysis of causal
effects is rather primitive. Much of the
modern empirical aid-effectiveness
literature has focused on whether the
impact of aid is conditional on policy or
whether aid  can be expected to have a
separate and positive impact,
independent of policy.Poverty In Focus   October 2007    11
The single most
common result in the
modern aid-growth
literature is actually
that aid has had a
positive impact on
per capita growth.
This has involved a mixture of concerns,
ranging from technically demanding
econometric modelling issues to
fundamentally different approaches
to development strategy and policy.
Thus, it is clear that the ‘true’ aid-growth
relationship is far from easily established.
In any case, aid is of much too limited a
size to turn the wheels of history.
Yet, this does not justify rejecting aid as
a useful instrument in the fight against
poverty. Nuanced and subtle
assessments are advisable with
the empirical evidence in hand; and
the single most common result in the
modern aid-growth literature is actually
that aid has had a positive impact
on per capita growth. No excessive
claims about aid impact should be
made on this basis—complacency is
not called for. Still, these established
results should not be overshadowed
by the aid criticism.
Turning to the debate about aid
allocation, there appears to be merit
in more sophisticated versions of
arguments for selectivity. Structural
adjustment lending makes little sense
when the macro policy environment is
‘bad’ and there is little possibility for
policy reform. However, the empirical
work on aid effectiveness has made
it clear that macro criteria should
not stand alone in assessing aid
effectiveness and determining
aid allocation.
‘Good policy’ can be dangerously
misleading as the fundamental criterion
for aid allocation, and simplistic macro
rules-of-thumb may make things worse.
Many of the world’s poorest people suffer
under substandard governance and lack
the means for changing it. It would be
gravely ironic for aid agencies to
compound the misfortunes of these
people with discriminatory aid allocation.
Overall, based on the research results it is
justified to argue for increased aid, but
expectations about its impact on growth
should be kept at reasonable levels.
It would be unfortunate if unrealistic
expectations about aid impact are once
again built up as in the early stages
of international aid. At the same time,
asserting that aid has a positive impact
and should be ‘scaled up’, and that its
impact does not appear to be conditional
on ‘good policy’, in no way contradicts
suggestions that future aid should be
carefully redesigned.
Much is indeed already happening on
the foreign aid scene. Major shifts have
taken place in aid modalities over the
past 15 years, and the general rise of a
culture of transparency and
accountability is more than superficial.
The March 2005 Paris Declaration on
Aid Effectiveness codifies best-practice
experience and it is now being
implemented (see below, page 26).
Three sets of critically important but
unresolved issues remain:
 Foreign aid has been associated with
both development successes and
failures. The basic analytical problem
in assessing its impact is to identify
the underlying development model.
We therefore continue to work with
debatable reduced form models,
while the data suggest that aid
effectiveness is very uneven. The
conditions for aid having a more
positive development impact remain
disputable. It remains a challenge to
better understand what drives the
different impacts of foreign aid, e.g.
the potential interaction with policies
and structural characteristics.
 We lack the necessary understanding
of the complex, country-specific links
between aid, growth and development
objectives such as poverty reduction to
justify selectivity as the basic approach
to aid allocation. This does not mean
that I favour old-fashioned ex-ante
conditionality, but a better
understanding of the intricacies of the
donor-recipient relationship in theory
and in practice would be valuable.
This would as key elements include
addressing issues such as how to best
(i) channel resources to the poor when
national governments fail to do so;
(ii) ensure that aid delivered directly
to national governments does not
undermine local accountability;
(iii) establish the appropriate balance
between aid to the government
and to private sector entities; and
(iv) strengthen incentives for genuine




populations is a demanding
but crucial task.
 In the present drive to scale up aid, it
is critically important to avoid making
the mistake of the past of promising
too much, i.e. contributing to the
misconception that aid can on its
own turn history. Based on history
aid has much to offer, but managing
expectations is far from easy. A major
challenge is to make sure promises
made are actually kept. There are
many unresolved issues here,
including how to design incentives
in aid agencies to meet this challenge
alongside topics such as the role of
independent evaluation, of donor
coordination, and of the need to
sharpen the incentives for recipients
to maximise reform efforts.
In conclusion, it would be gravely
ironic if disagreement about overall
development strategy and the
macroeconomic impact of aid got in the
way of pursuing practical and useful aid
funded activities in poor countries. There
is much to criticise in foreign aid, but
possibilities for constructive and forward
looking action should be kept in mind
throughout. There are in my experience
lots of them out there in practice. They
deserve to be uncovered more precisely
and implemented effectively to the
benefit of those in need. 
F. Tarp: Aid and Development, Swedish
Economic Policy Review, vol. 13, 2006,
pp. 9-61. http://www.ekonomiskaradet.se/
Panda_ekonomiska/Data/Documents/
sepr2006_2/Tarp.pdf12 International Poverty Centre
The global poverty
reduction impact of aid




they go for maximum global
poverty reduction or




and try to create equal
opportunities for all?
These alternatives have a




University of East Anglia Aid Allocation and
the MDGs
How donors decide to allocate
aid across countries is an important
and highly political policy issue.
It concerns fundamental principles
for the allocation of aid as well as
the evidence on the extent to which
aid promotes development objectives
in different country contexts. This article
discusses these issues and how they
affect approaches and strategies for
achieving the MDGs.
One principle which can guide aid
allocation decisions is that of ‘poverty-
efficiency’. This principle can be stated
simply: aid should be allocated so as to
achieve the largest possible reduction
in poverty at the global level, which
is consistent with the view that the
over-riding purpose of aid is to
eradicate poverty. Nevertheless,
it does have its critics.
One concern is that its strict application
would cause donors to neglect poor
countries in which the effectiveness of
aid at reducing poverty is considered
to be very low, due for example to
substandard governance.
Another concern is that the principle
fails to take into account the different
opportunities that developing countries
face for reducing poverty. For example,
poor countries which are geographically
isolated, or which have few natural
resources, will typically find it harder to
achieve sustained growth and poverty
reduction than other countries. Many
would argue that such countries should
be allocated additional aid, so as to
compensate for their relative lack
of opportunities.
Alternatives to the poverty-efficiency
principle, which address these concerns,
do exist. One alternative would be to
allocate aid so as to achieve a targeted
reduction in poverty in each recipient
country. Another alternative would
be an ‘equal-opportunity’ aid allocation,
which would allocate aid in a way which
compensates countries facing fewer
opportunities for growth and
poverty reduction.
Which of these different principles—
poverty-efficiency, country-by-country
targets, or equal-opportunity—is right is
of course a normative question involving
philosophical and moral considerations.
It is, however, a question certainly worth
thinking more about, not least to see
how much consensus exists on which
principle is considered to be right.
To apply any aid allocation principle
in practice, estimates are required
of the likely effects of aid on things
like economic growth, poverty and
governance, in different country
contexts. Some studies have shown that
the effect of aid on poverty, via its effect
on economic growth, is greater in
countries with a more favourable policy
and institutional environment. However,
there are now upwards of 60 different
estimates of the effect of aid on
economic growth. Many of these find
that aid’s effect does not vary much
across recipient countries, or that
it varies according to country
characteristics other than the policy
and institutional environment.
Because there is relatively little consensus
about precisely how aid affects poverty,
or other relevant outcomes, and about
how these effects vary across recipient
countries, there is a lot of disagreement
about what a poverty-efficient aid
allocation, or an equal opportunities
aid allocation, would look like in practice.
Possible ways of resolving this dilemma
are proposed below. First however, it is
worth considering the conflict betweenPoverty In Focus   October 2007    13
Notes: Figures refer to the 41 low-income countries with recent $1-a-day poverty estimates (89% of total population
of low-income countries in 2002). The additional amount of poverty reduction is calculated relative to a country-by-
country approach to meeting MDG 1.  References: See ODI Briefing Paper No. 19.
alternative aid allocation principles in
the context of attaining the MDGs.
In debates building up to the MDG
Review Summit in 2005, the uneven
progress towards each goal across
countries and regions became
immediately apparent. For instance,
while East and South Asia were either
on-track towards, or had already met,
the target of halving $1-a-day poverty
by 2015, progress in Sub-Saharan Africa
had been negative.
The main reaction to this uneven
progress was to recommend a large
scaling-up of aid, precisely to accelerate
progress in those countries and regions
where progress was lagging. This was
backed up by an interpretation of the
MDGs as country-level targets as well as
global ones, most prominently by the
UN Millennium Project, which in its
main report Investing in Development
interprets the MDGs as country goals,
“since this is the spirit in which they are
pursued the world over”.
Clearly, a country-level interpretation
of the MDGs requires donors to allocate
additional aid to lagging countries, even
if that aid could have a larger impact
on poverty elsewhere. It therefore
departs from the principle of global
poverty efficiency, and involves a
sacrifice—an ‘opportunity cost’—in
terms of the amount of progress
towards the MDGs achieved at the
global level.
How large is this opportunity cost?
Recent research has estimated its size
in relation to MDG 1, that of halving
$1-a-day poverty by 2015. It calculated
(i) the total amount of aid required if
each low-income country is to achieve
MDG 1; (ii) the amount of aid each low-
income country would receive if this
total amount were instead allocated
on a global poverty-efficient basis; and
(iii) the overall level of the $1-a-day
poverty measure for all low-income
countries through to 2015 under the
two allocation systems. The difference
between the two estimates gives the
opportunity cost of a country-by-
country approach to meeting MDG 1,
viz. the amount of poverty reduction at
the global level which is sacrificed as
a result of departing from a poverty-
efficient allocation.
The results of this research show that the
opportunity cost of a country-by-country
approach to meeting MDG 1 could be very
significant: it is unlikely to be less than 10
million people, and could be as high as
70 million people (see figure). The
additional reduction in poverty under a
poverty-efficient allocation would be
achieved in two main ways. The first
would be by allocating relatively more
aid (compared to a country-by-country
allocation) to South Asia, and relatively
less aid to Sub-Saharan Africa. The
second would be by allocating relatively
more aid within each region to countries
in which the effectiveness of aid at
reducing poverty is seen to be higher.
Of course, these findings do not
necessarily imply that interpreting the
MDGs on a country-by-country basis, and
allocating aid accordingly, is wrong. Such
an approach may be justified, for instance
because it avoids the possibility that
countries in which the effectiveness of aid
is considered to be very low are by-passed
by aid. In this case, the opportunity cost of
the approach would be a price worth
paying. The fact remains, however, that
donors should be aware of the size of this
cost, even if they regard it to be offset by
other normative considerations.
Two main implications arise from the
issues discussed here. First, donors
seeking to implement any allocation
principle in practice should consider
alternative estimates of the effectiveness
of aid in different country contexts.
Different estimates may well suggest
different ‘optimal’ allocations, though it
may still be possible to identify countries
which are currently under-aided (or over-
aided) whichever estimates are chosen.
Second, there is a need for more clarity
and debate about the underlying
principles on which aid allocation
decisions should be based. One issue is
whether aid should be allocated so as to
help achieve the MDGs on a country-by-
country basis or at the global level only.
Another is whether an equal-opportunity
aid allocation is preferable to a poverty-
efficient allocation.
Overall, the large scaling-up of aid
volume called for and agreed during
2005 need not come at the expense of a
sound approach to its allocation across
countries, as long as donors engage in
an open discussion about the principles
according to which allocation decisions
are made, and apply those principles
wisely in practice.
E. Anderson: Aid allocation and the MDGs.
How much should different countries get
and why? Briefing Paper No. 19, Overseas
Development Institute, London, April 2007.
http://www.odi.org.uk/publications/briefing/
bp_april07_aid_allocation.pdf14 International Poverty Centre
by Patrick Guillaumont,
CERDI1/Université d’Auvergne Aid Works Best in
Vulnerable Countries
Aid effectiveness is linked
much more to the economic
vulnerability of countries
than to their policies.
Export volatility has a
negative impact on growth,
while aid tends to have the
opposite effect.
Aid increases stability




Aid should increase more,
balance directly productive
and social sectors, and serve
as insurance against external
shocks and export volatility.
1. Centre d’Études et de Recherches
sur le Développement International.
The overall impact of aid on
income poverty has been examined
mainly through its effect on economic
growth. According to the most influential
paradigm, this impact is considered as
mainly depending on policy. The resulting
message—that priority in aid allocation is
to be given to countries with ‘good’ policies
and institutions—met a moral and
political sentiment not always grounded
on a robust assessment of aid effectiveness.
The sometimes intense debate on such
selectivity in allocating aid, initiated
by World Bank research some 10 years
ago, has at least made clear that aid
effectiveness is likely to depend on some
specific features of the recipient country.
But which features are most important?
One strand of empirical research has
shown that a major factor conditioning
aid effectiveness at the macro level
in recipient countries is the economic
vulnerability they face. In vulnerable
countries, foreign aid has a high marginal
productivity in avoiding collapses when
shocks occur, sometimes followed by
long lasting recessions. Aid can smooth
public expenditures and lower the risk of
fiscal deficit. Consequently the marginal
contribution of aid to economic growth
is shown to have been significantly
higher in recipient countries exposed
to external shocks.
There is not much debate about the
negative impact of ‘one-sided’ natural
negative shocks such as earthquakes,
typhoons or floods. The damage caused
by these events is often huge, first by
the number of deaths, second by the
destruction of physical capital. The debate
is rather about the measurement of the
size of these losses. Many shocks are
‘two-sided’, in particular external
economic volatility, such as a succession
of booms and slumps of export prices,
external demand, rainfalls etc. Therefore,
to assess vulnerability over a long period
it is appropriate to consider the impact of
instability or volatility rather than the
impact of separate shocks.
The effects of export instability, a main
source of structural vulnerability in
developing countries, have been
discussed for many years in the literature
on growth regressions. There seems to
be now a consensus emerging from
several studies to conclude that export
instability, or in some studies terms-of-
trade instability, has a negative effect on
growth. This effect comes mainly through
the instability of the rate of investment
and that of the real exchange rate, either
by its impact on public finance when
retained at the government level or by its
impact at the producer level.
Economic instability also affects growth
by triggering political instability that
sometimes can lead to armed conflict,
which is a very important cause of
economic decline. The instability of
exports is higher for countries exporting
unprocessed primary commodities subject
to large price volatility. Other exogeneous
shocks have been shown to have similar
effects on the risk of conflict, for example
rainfall instability.
At the project level, aid has been shown
to have stabilising effects that are not
directly perceived by the evaluators of
each project, since it cannot be easily
observed at that level. Indeed the
vulnerability of a country harms the
success of the projects, but less so when
the level of ODA received by the country
is high, which leads to the conclusion
that aid reduces the negative effects of
economic instability. Research results
substantiate the macro-micro linkages
and provide further support that more
aid should be given to vulnerable
countries because it can dampen the
negative effects of shocks. This can bePoverty In Focus   October 2007    15
done by taking into consideration a
measure of vulnerability in the criteria
used for aid selectivity.
By lowering growth, instability has
deleterious consequences on the pace of
poverty reduction. It also has direct social
effects independently of its effects on
growth. Two reasons make these direct
effects likely.
One is the feeling of frustration generated
by a shortfall of income following a rapid
expansion which creates new needs and
exaggerated expectations, as illustrated
above by the risk of civil war or of crime.
The other reason is due to poverty traps,
linked to the asymmetry of reactions of
health, education, employment to income
fluctuations. As far as instability lowers
growth, it slows down poverty reduction
normally expected from growth, but also
results in an anti-poor bias for a given
average rate of growth.
There is evidence that instability
of income worsens the social situation
in low income countries, and tends to
increase—or hamper the otherwise
occurring reduction of—the mortality
of children under five. Furthermore,
instability of income pushes people
into poverty traps; poor people contract
lasting health handicaps, their children
leave school, laid-off workers get
excluded from the labour market, etc.
Thus, the poverty impact of a rise of
average income is less than the impact
of a fall. This assymetrical effect lowers
the average impact of growth on poverty,
and increases poverty independently
of income growth and inequality change.
The current concern about aid volatility
notwithstanding, aid seems to have a
stabilising impact in the medium term; first
with respect to exports volatility, second
and more generally as a dampening factor
of income volatility. Aid volatility may
lower and possibly cancel this effect when
it is procyclical with regard to exogeneous
shocks, and even, but less likely, when it is
contra-cyclical and very high compared to
other sources of shocks. Pro-cyclical aid can
still be stabilising if it is relatively less
volatile than exports.
To assess the impact of aid on stability,
we consider an index corresponding to
the difference between the volatility of
(i) exports and (ii) the total inflow of aid
plus export revenues. If the difference is
positive, aid is stabilising; if it is negative,
aid is destabilising. The results for a
sample of more than 100 developing
countries over the period 1970–99 show
that, on average, it has been stabilising
and more clearly so during the 1990s
than previously; the indicator represents
18 per cent of the average value of the
instability of exports, and 28 per cent for
a sub-sample of African countries. On the
whole, aid was destabilising in less than
one tenth of cases.
The graph above illustrates the result in
terms of the net stabilising impact of aid,
measured by the above-mentioned
volatility difference index. It shows that
for any level of aid volatility overall
stability improves with higher aid/GDP
ratios. At the same time, overall stability
is not significantly influenced by the
level of aid volatility.
The stabilising effect of aid is due to the
mix of: (i) a level effect; (ii) a contra-cyclical
effect; (iii) a relative volatility effect.
It explains why aid seems more efficient
in terms of growth in countries more
affected by export instability.
Aid is likely to promote poverty reduction
by its stabilising impact through two
different channels: by increasing the pace
of growth and by avoiding poverty traps
and thus making growth more pro-poor.
There are three major implications
for aid policy:
 First, there is a need to balance the
utilisation of aid between directly
productive and social sectors, in order
to avoid poverty traps and transitory
loss of competitiveness.
 Second, aid should be designed
more to function as insurance
against exogeneous shocks, in order
to contribute to a faster and more
pro-poor long term growth.
 Third, due to the higher marginal
impact of aid in vulnerable countries
and in particular the Least Developed
Countries (LDCs), where the need of
a big increase of aid is the largest,
priority should be given to these
countries in aid allocation. To
implement such a new selectivity
it is possible to use the Economic
Vulnerability Index (EVI) set up at the
UN for the identification of LDCs. 
P. Guillaumont, S. Jeanneney Guillaumont:
Big Push versus Absorptive Capacity: How to
Reconcile the Two Approaches, UNU-WIDER
Conference “Aid, Principles and Policies”
Helsinki, June 2006. CERDI, Document de
travail de la série Etudes et Documents
E 2006.14. http://cerdi.org/Publi/
ED_Detail.asp?Id=806
Note: The level of stabilising effect of aid as defined in the text is represented for 16 groups of developing countries
classified by the quartiles of the aid to GDP ratio and the quartiles of aid volatility (Hodrik-Prescott measure).16 International Poverty Centre
The prospects for achieving the
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)
look bad in various developing countries,
notably in Sub-Saharan Africa. To turn
the tide, recent reports by the UN
Millennium Project and the Commission
for Africa issued urgent calls to increase
official development aid substantially
and, thereby, close the gap between
donor rhetoric and reality.
Qualitative aspects of aid allocation have
received considerably less attention even
though they may be as important for
effectively meeting recipient needs. In
particular, a needs-based targeting of aid
in priority sectors such as health and
education should have an important say
on whether donors help achieving the
MDGs. Hence, in addition to the usual
The overall share of the
social sectors has nearly
doubled in 15 years, but
this varies a lot across donors.
Unless the sector targeting
of aid is better focused on
MDG needs, even much
larger aid may not be enough.
Sectoral Aid Priorities:
Missing MDG Targets?
by Rainer Thiele1, Peter Nunnenkamp1
and Axel Dreher2
ranking of donors according to their
overall ‘generosity’, the structure of aid
portfolios offers interesting insights as
to whether aid has been prioritised in
line with the MDGs.
The sectoral composition of aid by all
donors taken together has changed
quite dramatically since the early 1990s.
Most notable in the context of the
MDGs, the share of aid devoted to
the social sector has almost doubled
(to about 35 per cent in 2002-04), with
higher spending on education, health
and population programs, though not
on water and sanitation.
However, this overall pattern masks
substantial variation across donors.
In recent years, social sector aid ranged
from 23 per cent of total aid in Japan
to 50 per cent in Norway. France and
Germany put a strong focus on
education but spent very little
on primary education, even though
the MDGs would require donors to
concentrate on this sub-category. The
United Kingdom stands out in that
education and health-related aid was
focused on basic services from which
poor population segments might benefit
most. Denmark and Germany were the
only donors that provided a non-
negligible share of total aid for basic
water and sanitation. Environmental
protection and gender equality, which
both explicitly correspond to MDGs, were
largely neglected by almost all donors.
Different aid priorities of donors must
not necessarily imply inappropriate
targeting. While a multi-dimensional
objective function follows from the MDG
project, coordinated donor efforts may
have resulted in a division of labour with
specific donors concentrating on specific
MDGs. Coordination and harmonisation
indeed figure high on the policy agenda
of donors. The Paris Declaration on Aid
1. The Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
2. ETH Zurich – KOF Swiss Economic Institute.
Matching MDGs, indicators of need and aid categories
Indicators of need Aid categories
Target 2: Hunger
undernourishment developmental food aid
malnutrion of children emergency food aid
Target 3: Primary schooling
net primary enrolment education
primary completion rate basic education
average years of schooling
Target 4: Gender disparity in education
ratio girls/boys in education education
literacy ratio, males/females basic education
Target 5: Under-5 mortality
under-5 mortality rate health
immunization, measles basic health
Target 6: Maternal mortality
maternal mortality ratio health
births attended basic health
Target 7: HIV/AIDS
prevalence of HIV health
population programs
Target 8: Malaria, other diseases
incidence tuberculosis health
malaria ecology basic health
Targets 10/11: Water & sanitation/ slum dwellers
access to improved water water supply & sanitation
access to improved sanitation basic drinking waterPoverty In Focus   October 2007    17
Effectiveness emphasized the need
“to eliminate duplication of efforts
and to rationalize donor activities to
make them as cost-effective as possible.”
Yet donor coordination remains elusive.
Donors tend to favor the same ‘aid
darlings’. Comparing pairs of major
donors with regard to the allocation of
aid across 140 recipient countries, most
of the correlations turn out to be positive
and very few are significantly negative.
This applies not only to total aid per
capita of the recipients’ population, but
also to sector-specific aid for health,
education, and water and sanitation.
It is against this backdrop that we assess
whether donors allocated aid according
to specific needs of recipients. We
analyze the impact of ‘indicators of need’
related to the non-income MDGs on the
distribution of sector-specific aid across
140 recipient countries. We control for
the per-capita income of recipient
countries and democracy indicators
in order to isolate the impact of the
indicators of need listed in the
matching table below.
It is important to note that all
explanatory variables are weighted by
the recipient countries’ population. This
implies that the unit of observation is
the individual, rather than the country.
This approach is taken because of the
global character of the MDG concept;
success or failure depends on the
percentage of the worldwide
population, rather than the number of
countries reaching a particular target.
Obviously, the results may be driven
mainly by China and India. Therefore,
we perform additional estimations by
excluding these two heavyweights to
test for the sensitivity of results.
We compare eleven bilateral and
multilateral donors on the basis of their
aid commitments in 2002-2004. The aid
categories under consideration are
supposed to be most relevant for aid to
be effective in contributing to the MDGs.
This is not to deny that other aid
categories such as humanitarian and
multi-sector aid may also promote the
MDGs. In addition, it should be stressed
that addressing the question of whether
donors paid sufficient attention to the
MDGs by allocating aid according to
related indicators of need does not allow
strong conclusions on the effectiveness
of aid. Well targeted aid is a necessary,
though not a sufficient condition for
aid to be effective.
We rank the eleven donors under
consideration as follows. Each donor
may achieve a maximum of 64 ‘credit
points’: one point for each significant
coefficient of the specific indicator of
need in the allocation of sector-specific
aid (see table); 0.5 extra points when a
significant coefficient is robust to the
exclusion of China and India; another
0.5 extra points when the per-capita
income of recipients enters significantly
negative at the same time, revealing a
general poverty orientation of aid.
A similar procedure is applied for
comparing the targeting of sector-
specific aid across the MDGs.
No donor comes close to the maximum.
Yet there are striking differences
(see graph). It appears to be in line
with conventional wisdom on particular
donors’ performance that Japan ranks
at the bottom and Norway at the top.
However, the group of donors with
weak targeting includes not only a
nother donor widely blamed to be low-
performing—the United States—but also
countries usually regarded as superior
donors like Denmark, IDA and Sweden.
The latter donors are more MDG-oriented
in terms of granting more aid to poorer
recipients, including humanitarian and
multi-sector aid. However, more sector-
specific targeting has played a minor
role for them, too.
On the other hand, France ranges close
to the top in allocating aid to MDG-
related priority areas. The fine-tuning
of French aid according to specific
indicators of need qualifies earlier
verdicts that the poverty orientation
of its aid allocation is particularly weak.
Likewise, there are striking differences in
targeting sector-specific aid across the
MDGs under consideration (not shown
in the graph). The fight against HIV/AIDS
(Target 7) clearly stands out, with almost
half of the maximum of possible ‘credit
points’ being reached. This implies that
almost all donors focused on this target.
Target 2 comes second, though at a
considerable margin—22 per cent of
possible credit points. By contrast, various
targets were largely neglected, namely
Targets 3, 4, 5 and 10/11. The targeting
is particularly poor with respect to the
objective of achieving universal primary
education (Target 3). The allocation
of aid in education was shaped by the
corresponding indicators of need for
just three donors—France, Germany
and Norway—and only weakly so.
All this invites the conclusion that the
current focus on substantially increasing
aid in order to turn the tide and try to
achieve the MDGs misses an important
point: Unless the targeting of aid to
MDG-related priority areas is improved,
increasing the amount of aid is unlikely
to have the desired effects.
R. Thiele, P. Nunnenkamp, A. Dreher:
Do Donors Target Aid in Line with the
Millennium Development Goals? A Sector
Perspective of Aid Allocation. Forthcoming in
Review of World Economics. http://www.uni-
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A major problem facing both the
International Monetary Fund and its
critics is the limited knowledge about key
economic relationships that determine
how macroeconomic policies will
influence growth and poverty outcomes
in a particular country, e.g. how different
types of public spending will affect future
economic capacity and competitiveness,
how private investment might respond
to lower fiscal deficits or how long any
increase in aid flows will last.
What key actors assume about these
relationships influences fiscal policies.
For example, whether higher aid-
financed spending may cause adverse
macroeconomic effects of concern for
the longer term depends critically on the
likely supply response to such spending.
If higher aid-financed spending on non-
traded goods pushes up the real
exchange rate in the short-term—i.e.
causes some temporary ‘Dutch disease’
effects—we should not be too concerned
provided the spending improves
competitiveness in the longer term.
So, the most important challenge facing
aid-dependent countries is often not a
The IMF and Spending
for the MDGs
     by David Goldsbrough and Ben Elberger,
Center for Global Development (CGD)
IMF conditionality has
erred on the conservative
side, leading to less
aid delivery and less
effective use of aid, e.g.
for MDG-related spending.
It tends to favour domestic
debt reduction or external
reserve increases over
additional public spending.
It has not done enough
to help countries explore




is untenable. IMF should
focus more on analysis and
less on specific conditionality.
‘macro’ one at all.  It is to ensure that
additional spending is used effectively,
which requires good governance, sound
public financial management, and
strong sector-level policies. If those
are right, the more narrowly ‘macro’
challenges will be manageable.
In fact, different judgments about the
likely effectiveness of higher spending
may underlie many of the disagreements
between the IMF and its critics on macro
frameworks with respect to the
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).
With some recent exceptions, the IMF has
not done a good job of incorporating
supply-side responses into its country-
level macroeconomic analysis and can
implicitly assume that additional public
spending will have little impact on
growth. In contrast, those who produce
MDG-costing scenarios often assume
that the ‘technical’ costing ratios around
the MDGs can be scaled up without the
huge governance problems and
‘leakages’ common to other types
spending that have been a fact of life
in many low-income countries. Neither
assumption is likely to be correct.
In practice, we can never know, without
trying, what the impact of more
ambitious spending strategies will be.
So countries are forced to make policy
choices under considerable uncertainty
and balance the costs of different
potential mistakes; between threats to
macro ‘stability’—i.e. inflation, Dutch
disease, and fiscal deficits all worsen due to
weak supply responses—and foregoing
expenditure opportunities that might
improve the lives of the poor and raise
growth. How these risks are balanced
should depend on the macroeconomic
situation—which in most countries is
much better than a decade ago—as well
as on governance and sector-specific
policies that influence the likely
effectiveness of additional spending.Poverty In Focus   October 2007    19
Since the IMF does not have the expertise
to judge these sector-specific issues, it
should be humble in its macroeconomic
pronouncements if sufficient information
is unavailable. Furthermore, even if these
economic relationships were fully
understood, many fiscal policy
decisions—especially for the health
sector—involve fundamental social
choices that should be left to national
political processes. The IMF job, therefore,
is to help countries explore the
consequences of feasible policy options
to clarify the trade-offs involved.
In this context, the IMF has not done
enough to explore more expansionary
but still feasible options for higher
government spending. As a consequence,
the initial fiscal content of some ‘IMF
programs’ has been too conservative.
In particular, programs tended to favor
domestic debt reduction or external
reserve increases over additional
spending, even when macroeconomic
conditions were quite favorable. Faced
with huge uncertainty about key
economic relationships, many IMF
programs implicitly assumed with
insufficient justification that the balance
of risks was against additional spending.
The problem is not that the IMF is
pursuing a ‘one size fits all’ approach,
imposing the same squeezes on deficits
and spending in all countries. In fact, IMF
programs vary considerably in the size of
targeted changes in fiscal deficits and
public spending (see graph). Reflecting
better macroeconomic starting conditions,
recent programs, on average, targeted
small increases in fiscal deficits and overall
spending, compared with targeted cuts in
earlier programs. For example, programs
negotiated between 2003 and 2006
targeted average expansions in the fiscal
deficit before grants and in spending of
about ½ - 1 per cent of GDP in the first
program year.
Despite this shift toward moderate fiscal
expansion, both a recent study of IMF
programs in Africa by the IMF Independent
Evaluation Office (IEO) and the detailed
country case studies for the CGD Working
Group (see end-reference) found that the
IMF has tended to favour additional
domestic debt reduction or external reserve
increases over additional public spending.
The IEO study found that, across all
programs in Africa, each additional dollar
of expected aid was associated with a
targeted fiscal expansion, i.e. additional
spending, of only 27 cents. Only when
external reserves were quite high, above
2½ months of imports, and domestic
macroeconomic conditions highly
stable—represented in the IEO study by
inflation under 5 per cent—did programs
aim to channel the bulk of additional aid
to higher spending.
While the IMF is right to take account
of the level of reserves and domestic
macroeconomic conditions when
designing fiscal policies and how
aid will be used, the degree to which
these factors influenced the fiscal
strategy seems too conservative. A wider
range of paths for the fiscal deficit and
spending is now possible, following
debt relief and with the prospect of
higher aid, but there was often little
analysis—at least in publicly available
IMF documents—of the rationale
underlying the specific path chosen
for the fiscal deficit and overall
government spending.
With some commendable recent
exceptions, the IMF has also failed to
explore the macroeconomic consequences
of scenarios for scaling up aid. In some
earlier programs in the case study
countries, IMF aid projections were
oriented around goals of reducing aid
dependency—e.g. Mozambique in 2002-
2003—or avoiding borrowing even on
concessional terms—e.g. Rwanda in 2003-
2004—without convincing macroeconomic
arguments for the prescribed approach.
The IMF programs did eventually adapt
when substantially higher aid was
forthcoming but it is not possible to
say whether the initial negative signals
discouraged any aid.
The IMF approach seems to be slowly
changing: in the last couple of years,
in-depth analyses of alternative scenarios
for ‘scaling up’ aid have been undertaken
in several countries, e.g. Ethiopia,
Madagascar, Zambia and, very recently,
Mozambique and Rwanda. However,
expectations of IMF staff by the IMF
Board remain unclear and much seems
to depend on the initiative of individual
mission chiefs.
This ambiguity causes two problems.
First, the IMF has not done all it could
do to help countries explore the
macroeconomic consequences of higher
aid. Second, it risks sending confused
signals to donors. For example, if only
conservative scenarios are presented,
does this mean the IMF thinks more
resources cannot usefully be absorbed
from a macroeconomic perspective or
only that the IMF does not think more
resources will be forthcoming?
In fact, projections of aid to Africa in
IMF programs remain conservative,
reflecting skepticism by IMF staff—which
may be justified—on donors’ resolve to
deliver on their commitments to double
aid by 2010. Of the 27 IMF programs and
reviews in Sub-Saharan Africa that were
completed in the 18 months after the
Gleneagles Summit, aid projections in
only two were as optimistic as the
Gleneagles commitments.
A fundamental message of the Working
Group is that if the IMF is to continue
being heavily involved in these




signaling to donors on the suitability
of macroeconomic frameworks—it
needs to adapt its analytical approach
and way of doing business. Clearly, an
alternative division of labour is possible
in which the IMF confines itself to short-
term stability issues and makes no
pretence of pronouncing on the longer
term challenges of scaling up aid and
expenditures. The IMF Board could
make clear that the IMF role in post-
stabilisation low-income countries will
be much more limited and scale back its
involvement and policy pronouncements
accordingly. But, if the IMF is to continue
to play the broader role that the
international community seems to want,
its current approach is untenable and the
institution should transition to a role
focused more on exploration and less
on specific conditionality. 
Does The IMF Constrain Health Spending in
Poor Countries? Evidence and an Agenda for
Action. Report of the CGD Working Group
on IMF Programs and Health Spending.
http://www.cgdev.org/section/initiatives/
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The prospect of large increases in
the flow of resources from wealthy to
poor countries in support of efforts to
achieve the MDGs is viewed with some
trepidation by Ministries of Finance and
Central Banks in some poor countries. In
fact, in the past few years, many countries
have actively tried to reduce the rate at
which resources have been transferred
into their economies. While there may
certainly be real concern about several
different kinds of negative side-effects of
large aid inflows, the dominating fear in
the recent economic literature is that of
aid-induced ‘Dutch disease’.
What do economists mean by ‘Dutch
disease’? The theory is that high and
sustained aid inflows have much the
same effect as a natural resource
windfall, which can lead to an
appreciated exchange rate and wage
inflation, and thus to a loss of markets
and umemployment in export and
import-competing sectors. This effect
appeared in the Dutch economy when
massive North Sea gas revenues upset
the macroeconomic balance—hence the
name. The fear is that high inflows of
aid may thus prove to be a ‘curse’ by
contributing to the immiserisation of
their export sectors.
If the Dutch disease scenario were likely,
there would be good reason for fear. It
would not only mean that countries may
become unable to produce significant
amounts of exportable goods—there
may also be very real adjustment costs.
For example, cash crop producing
farmers who are unable to maintain
their livelihood may not easily transform
themselves into construction or service
sector workers. Thus such an economy
may have large pockets of increasing
despair and poverty even as other areas,
as well as the broader economy, appear
to be doing well.
Yet, despite its prominence in the
development literature, there is no
explicitly documented case of aid-
induced Dutch disease. Some
researchers have found cross-country
evidence suggesting that very large
increases in aid may lead to slower growth
of export sectors, but no single-country
study has been able to demonstrate a
link between large increases in aid
inflows and a contraction in tradable
goods producing sectors. While this
paucity of evidence does not amount
to a refutation of the hypothesis, it does
suggest that the fear is exaggerated.
Let us look at a few concrete country
examples from published research
papers: (i) Tanzania in the period 1985–93
received a significant increase in ODA
flows in relation to GDP, which were
associated with accelerated export
growth, strong economic growth and
a real exchange rate that depreciated—
more sharply than in the previous nine-
year period; (ii) Botswana between 1960
and 1980 experienced a depreciating
exchange rate and a stellar growth rate
while ostensibly receiving a windfall
from its rapidly expanding diamond
mining industry, as well as aid equivalent
to an average of fifteen percent of its
GDP. Botswana would thus appear to
have been a perfect test case for the
combined Dutch disease effects, but
none appears to have been present;
(iii) Foreign aid inflows to the 12
countries1 of the West African CFA
Franc zone were associated with a real
depreciation of their common currency.
Despite the absence of compelling
evidence of aid-induced Dutch disease,
the fear of that outcome seems to be the
dominant concern of policymakers and
researchers when poor countries face
aid surges. The desire to avoid currency
appreciation, the expected precursor
by John Serieux,
University of Manitoba Aid and Dutch Disease:
Nothing to Fear but Fear Itself?
Fear of ‘Dutch disease’
has made some poor
countries shelve aid rather
than use it as intended for
poverty reduction.
Such a response to the
promised rise of aid is a
real threat to the prospects
for achieving the MDGs.
It is also uncalled for.
Many examples show that
increased aid can strengthen
the economy with the
right policies.
The onus is on donors to
reduce aid volatility and
increase aid predictability.
1. Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African
Republic, Chad, Congo (Republic of), Côte d’Ivoire,
Gabon, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo.
2. Ethiopia, Ghana, Mozambique, Tanzania and Uganda.Poverty In Focus   October 2007    21
to the disease, often seems to override
the need to ensure that aid is used
effectively for its intended purpose.
Take the case of Uganda in 1998-2000,
when aid inflows essentially doubled,
mostly in the form of budget support;
a major preoccupation of economic
policy makers was avoiding an exchange
rate appreciation. The response was
continuous reserve accumulation and
sale of government treasury bills to keep
inflation low. The real effective exchange
rate in fact depreciated through most of
that period, and both real and nominal
interest rates became very high with
predictable domestic effects. Furthermore,
Uganda had to cope with a significant
net private capital inflow in 2003 as the
high domestic interest rates led to foreign
purchases of Ugandan treasury bills. This
not only made matters worse but clearly
indicated that this approach to handling
aid inflows can be self-defeating if the
capital account is even partially open.
The Ugandan experience is one of five
similar episodes reviewed by the IMF
for the period 1998-2003. The IMF study
concludes that the optimal approach to
aid in the form of budgetary support is
to allow a current account deficit equal to
the size of the aid inflow, and to increase
government expenditure by an amount
equal to the domestic value of aid
inflows. Neither the expected real
appreciation of the currency, nor
additional relative prices shifts that may
imply higher inflation were expected to be
large since both effects will be moderated
by the use of foreign exchange to
purchase imports and by supply
responses in the non-traded goods
sectors. Yet, none of the five countries
examined2 quite achieved that ideal.
The failure to make maximum use of
aid appeared to have come largely from
fears about real appreciations, inflation,
and large fiscal and current account
deficits. In general, the predominant
concerns were assuaged—real exchange
rates depreciated or stayed constant,
inflation was kept down and
government budget deficits were
moderate or small—but this was at the
cost of very high real domestic interest
rates and, most tellingly, a general failure
to fully utilise aid for its intended
purpose or, in the case of Ghana
and Ethiopia, to use it at all.
To understand what might amount
to a ‘cure’ for Dutch disease, let us go
back to the description of Dutch disease.
This economic ‘malady’ occurs essentially
because two things are happening
simultaneously: a fall in the domestic
value of foreign currency resulting from
the aid inflow, and wage hikes resulting
from increasing domestic demand for
non-traded goods. These effects combine
to squeeze the profits out of tradable
goods production. The cure: designing
policies to moderate or reverse one or
both of these effects without
exacerbating the other.
Wages need not increase if there is readily
available labour to meet increased
demand and/or an increase in
labour productivity.
If there is a high level of unemployment
in the economy, then an increase in
domestic demand can be met without
increasing wages or prices. There will
be, essentially, no wage effect and the
output price effect for tradable goods
producing firms will be significantly
smaller—because real exchange rates
do not rise as much—thus reducing any
profit squeeze. An IMF research paper
confirms that the Dutch disease need not
materialize in low-income countries that
can draw on their idle productive
capacity to satisfy the aid-induced
increased demand.
If workers are more productive, i.e.
producing more units of output per unit
of labour, labour cost per unit of output
will generally not increase even if wages
rise. Thus, the producers of tradable
goods are not squeezed from the cost
side and may even experience lower
unit costs. Profits may remain largely
unaffected or increase.
What might come closest to a ‘cure’
for Dutch disease would be a conscious
attempt to use aid receipts to increased
productivity in the economy. What is
critical here is whether aid related to
MDGs can be translated into increased
productivity. There are strong reasons
to believe that the answer to that
question is ‘yes’.
While the long term link between such
MDG-related attributes as education
and child mortality and future
productivity has long been understood,
the link between most of the human
development achievements represented
in the MDGs and current productivity is
perhaps less often appreciated. For
example, aid for poverty reduction can
have immediate benefits in terms of
increased worker productivity,
reduced morbidity and increased
enterprise. Similar effects would be
obtained by reducing the incidence
and impact of AIDS, e.g. though
anti-viral therapies.
More importantly, though, MDG-related
initiatives require the development of
physical and institutional infrastructure
that has important multi-sectoral effects.
Good examples would be improved
roads that improve access to both
health facilities and markets for remote
communities, and the use of institutions
to engage communities in broader
development goals. Thus both the
achievement of MDGs and the process
related to that achievement can result in
specific and generalised increases
in productivity.
However, these achievements are not
a given. It will likely require planned
sequencing of aid spending, coordinated
across MDG-related initiatives as well as
with other development initiatives. This
is by no means a minor challenge but it
remains feasible for most countries.
The true potential curse of large aid
flows may not be Dutch disease but
aid volatility. In the absence of effective
attempts by donors to manage volatility
in aid flows, countries may have to create
reserve buffers that allow for some
decoupling of the timing of disbursements
and the timing of domestic spending of
such disbursements. This would diminish
the utility of aid. The onus is on donors
to reduce aid volatility and increase
aid predictability.
John Serieux: Managing the Exchange
Rate Consequences of an MDG-Related
Scale-up in HIV/AIDS Financing, IPC
Conference Paper No. 1. March 2007.
http://www.undp-povertycentre.org/pub/
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Terry McKinley,
International Poverty Centre Use Aid for Investing
in the MDGs—
Not for Reserves and Debts
Much of the recent debate
on aid effectiveness has
focused on the danger
to macroeconomic stability
of a projected aid surge.
An IMF evaluation reveals
that only a minor part of
ODA to Africa was used to
finance public spending,
while nearly three-quarters
went into reserves or debt
buy-backs.
This is not the way
to use aid as a means to





ODA is needed for building
national capacities to
mobilise domestic savings
and raise public revenue.
Much of the recent debate on aid
effectiveness has focused on the danger
to macroeconomic stability of a projected
aid upsurge. This article seeks to shift
the debate from this short-sighted
preoccupation to how ODA can
contribute to long-term development.
For gauging the macroeconomic impact
of a scaling up of ODA, the IMF’s new
‘spend-and-absorb’ analytical framework
is a useful starting-point although it is
designed for macroeconomic
accounting, not for highlighting
development objectives.
The IMF framework has helped
underscore how little of ODA has been
either spent or absorbed. The 2007
evaluation ‘The IMF and Aid to Sub-
Saharan Africa’ by the IMF Independent
Evaluation Office documents these
shortfalls for low-income countries
with support from IMF’s Poverty
Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF).
During 1999-2005, 36 per cent of ODA
went, at the margin, into reserve
accumulation—i.e. was not absorbed—and
another 37 per cent was used to retire
domestic debt—i.e. was not spent (graph
below). That left only a modest 27 per
cent of ODA to finance fiscal expansion.
For promoting long-term growth and
human development, such an allocation is
clearly suboptimal. In the short term, since
absorption (100% - 36% = 64%) exceeds
aid spending (27%), the potential growth
of aggregate demand will be constrained
and any rise in inflation minimal.
There is, of course, no shortage of
apologists ready to justify such a skewed
distribution of ODA. Unquestionably,
domestic and external financial
liberalisation have exposed developing
countries to recurrent financial crises.
So they need a credible stock of reserves
to ward off the effects of probable
terms-of-trade or capital-outflow shocks.
But reserve accumulation has become
excessive, if not counter-productive,
by forestalling an expansion of public
investment. What is worse: the IMF
evaluation does not address the bleaker
possibility that ODA financed net private
capital outflows, rather than reserves
of foreign securities. The financing of
such a circuit of capital would be doubly
demoralising—conducive neither to
stability nor development.
In addition to excessive stockpiling of
reserves, why has 58 per cent (37/64)
of the non-reserve financing available
for fiscal expansion been diverted into
paying off domestic debt? During the
1990s, when ODA was falling, low-income
countries had to resort, understandably,
to other means to finance government
expenditures. Domestic debt was a major
option. But it provided only short-term
relief while exacting high interest payments.
Now that net ODA is on the rise, domestic
debt is still demanding to be paid off.Poverty In Focus   October 2007    23
The result: a strong negative correlation
between ODA and domestic debt. Thus,
ironically ODA is merely compensating
in the 2000s for its relative absence
during the 1990s.
Advocates of private-sector led
development might applaud such an
ODA allocation. After all, when central
banks purchase back government
securities, will this not inject more
liquidity into the private sector?
Will interest rates not tend to fall?
Evidence suggests, on the contrary,
that interest rates have remained high
in low-income countries in sub-Saharan
Africa. The share of such countries with
real rates of interest higher than six per
cent has risen to about 80 per cent.
And the gulf between deposit and
lending rates of interest remains
unusually wide.
Such investment-depressing conditions
—for both public and private
investment—are prominent features of
the financial sector in sub-Saharan Africa.
As long as financial institutions remain
riveted on short-term profits, there is
little prospect for accelerated capital
accumulation, a driving force for long-
term growth and human development.
Capital markets remain shallow in
sub-Saharan Africa and lending remains
risk-averse, particularly in the wake of
financial liberalisation. This is why
government borrowing also remains
mired in the short term. ODA could
play a pivotal role in helping countries
break this gridlock—by building up
the capacity of domestic financial
institutions to mobilise domestic savings
and direct it to productive public as
well as private investment.
Because of the high cost of government
borrowing, it is not surprising that
public investment has been in secular
decline in sub-Saharan since the early
1980s—falling from roughly 10 per cent
of GDP to seven per cent by 2000—after
having risen from about six per cent in
the early 1970s.
Until recently, public investment has
been treated like a poor orphan in
development circles. Poverty reduction
programmes did not appreciably
improve its status in the 1990s, except
perhaps for some investments in social
infrastructure. But the MDG framework
has put a hefty expansion of public
investment back squarely on the
development agenda.
There is also greater acknowledgement
that increased public investment could
‘crowd-in’ private investment, instead of
‘crowd it out’. This impact is more likely
when the capital stock has been allowed
to deteriorate over decades, as has been
the case in sub-Saharan Africa. Under
such conditions, initial investments can
have dramatically increasing returns.
The case for public investment is
strengthened if a large boost in public
investment is needed in order to propel
countries out of a ‘poverty trap’. This has
been a major rationale for the proposed
MDG-oriented scaling up of ODA in
low-income countries.
But ODA has proven to be volatile and
unreliable. And, clearly, incurring
domestic debt is not a viable alternative.
So a preferable long-term solution for
public finances is to mobilise more
domestic revenue. In fact, instead of
dampening the incentives for mobilising
revenue—as some analysts have
claimed—ODA should be channelled
into strengthening national capacities
to mobilise much more.
Unfortunately, low-income countries
in sub-Saharan Africa have made only
meagre progress in raising tax revenue.
As a share of GDP, total tax revenue
rose between the early 1990s and the
early 2000s from 11.6 per cent to only
13.2 per cent—a mere 1.6 percentage
points (graph above).
Trade liberalisation has prevented a rise in
trade taxes despite increasing imports
in the 2000s. And direct taxes have risen
slowly despite an upturn of economic
growth. Moreover, the value added tax,
though widely adopted, has failed to
live up to its promise to improve
taxation of consumption.
It is clear that ODA is not being
optimised. No wonder that people fret
about its effectiveness. It caters mainly
to a short-term preoccupation with
macroeconomic stability.
And when disbursed, ODA is not
directed to priority development
objectives, such as building national
capacities to mobilise domestic savings
and raise domestic revenue.
Consequently, public and private
investments continue to languish,
particularly in poorer regions, such as
sub-Saharan Africa, where a substantial
scaling up of investment is most needed.
T. McKinley (2007): (i) Raising Domestic
Revenue for the MDGs: Why Wait until
2015?’, IPC One Pager No. 39; and
(ii) Why Have Tax Reforms Hampered
MDG Financing?’ , IPC One Pager No. 42.
http://www.undp-povertycentre.org/site/
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As the process of debt cancellation
slowly unfolds and brings the lengthy
developing country debt crisis to a
welcome end, new debt seems to be more
than ready to replace the old—from new
public donors sitting on huge resources
or even from private investors lured by
the rise in oil and commodity prices.
Among the mainstream donors in
the DAC1, however, the doctrine on
concessional loans remains marred by
the experience of the debt crisis: rather
than lending aid money is it not safer
to give it away as grants? For the layman,
grants look more generous and more
morally appropriate. Aid campaigners
see loans as a way to enslave debtors,
but tend to ignore the impact of grants
on the dependency of the recipients.
The degree of misunderstanding on this
issue is enormous. Clearly, the principle
behind official development assistance
(ODA) is to transfer resources from rich
countries to developing countries. These
resources are effective grants, paid for
by the taxpayers in donor countries.
However, the way in which they are
transferred does matter. For example,
giving ODA through grants might feel
safer–notably after a major debt crisis–but
it means that donors leave debt concerns
to others. Donors may also fear the
‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ effect of having
their grants finally serve to repay debts
possibly unduly contracted from others.
Moreover, there is an interesting
behavioural anomaly in being more
willing to give away resources than
to risk them through careful lending.
Different financial instruments carry
different sets of incentives, as
documented by the theoretical and
empirical literature on grants versus
loans. This will not be the focus here, as
there will be grants and loans to
developing countries even if official
donors resort to grants only. The choice
of instruments should therefore be
addressed in the wider context.
Concessional loans should be thought of
as a combination of market loans and
of subsidies–the ‘grant element’. A typical
ODA lending institution such as AFD
borrows from capital markets with its
AAA rating and on-lends to targeted
beneficiaries with various degrees of
subsidisation. A natural question to ask,
therefore, is whether this intermediation
provides any value added compared to
the unfettered functioning of financial
markets. Some argue that aid agencies
should make grants only, and let
financial market actors do the lending,
because they are superior to public
agencies in deciding when and how to
lend and in assessing risk.
For example, a critique often raised
against ODA loans is that lending
agencies indulge in ‘defensive lending’,
i.e. lending to their debtors the money
that allows them to service past loans.
Empirical evidence confirms that there
was some defensive lending in the 1990s
but shows no indication of such lending
in the 1980s.
The validity of the grants-only argument,
though, depends on whether developing
countries have access to financial
markets. If not, they could not
complement the ODA grants they receive
by borrowing from financial markets;
ODA loans can then usefully leverage
the amount of grant resources available.
Arguably, in a steady state with a
constant flow of ODA loans, the real
resource transfer to developing countries
would simply consist in the grant-
element of these loans, and thus a grant-
based and a concessional-loan-based
approach would be equivalent. But we
by Pierre Jacquet,
Chief Economist,
French Development Agency (AFD) Grants versus Loans—
Post Debt Crisis Redux
1. The Development Assistance Committee of the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD).
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The choice of aid terms
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Aid modalities can be
modernised to better
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are not in a steady state as there is a
recognized shortage of ODA. Anyhow, the
transition from one approach to the other
is problematic if developing countries do
not have full capital market access.
Economists such as Bulow and Rogoff have
argued that developing countries lack
access to capital markets because they are
unlikely to repay their debts. If that is the
case, resorting to public lending to
compensate for this lack of access would
be unwarranted and inefficient.
Poor governance and a lack of credible
institutions indeed limit developing
countries’ access to financial markets.
However, a number of market
imperfections may also explain this
lack of access and may justify public
intervention. Consider the well-known
‘Lucas paradox’ asking why capital does
not flow from capital-rich to capital-poor
countries. One explanation is that returns
to capital in capital-poor countries
depend on complementary assets such
as infrastructure and human capital.
Another could be that insufficient
international trade integration raises
the local relative price of capital.
Yet another explanation is the high
volatility in resource flows, which
translates into an increase in perceived
risk and into higher spreads that
discourage capital inflows. The exclusion
of poor countries from international
financial markets is not necessarily a
consequence of bad governance, but
may instead result from vulnerability to
external shocks, e.g. commodity price
shocks or natural disasters. For a sample
of 24 highly indebted poor countries
(HIPC), export revenues fluctuated
between 42 per cent and 205 per cent
of their average level between 1970 and
2005. More than two thirds of the total
exports of the least developed countries
are unprocessed primary commodities.
Here, the market imperfection stems from
the lack of an efficient procedure
for dealing with debt crises in case
of negative shocks. Yet, a grant-only
approach would be inefficient. For
example, if there is one chance out of
two that a country will repay its loans, it
is still preferable to make a loan rather
than a grant, of the same nominal
amount: in present value, this will entail
half the cost for the donor country
taxpayer. However, if a new debt crisis is
to be avoided, care must be taken that
debt is automatically cancelled when a
negative shock beyond a certain
threshold occurs.
Thus, responsible lending should
internalise the risk of debt default so
that debt remains sustainable. A logical
approach would have ODA lenders use
their aid budgets to provision that risk
and react swiftly with debt cancellation
in the event of a shock of agreed
proportions. The size of the provision
would be modulated according to a
detailed country risk analysis that would
penalise poorly governed countries—by
using a greater proportion of available
ODA resources in the form of provisions
against risk—and limit the moral hazard
inherent in any such insurance scheme.
However, such use of taxpayers’ funds is
difficult in the current framework because
it would not count as ODA—even though
debt reduction would count as ODA if
and when it occurs. There is a case for
modernising the statistical definition
of ODA, but this will be a long and
protracted process. Alternatives exist, that
consist in developing contingent loans.
For example, AFD has introduced a highly
concessional, contracyclical loan that
allows the borrower to benefit from
additional grace periods—beyond a fixed
initial 5 year grace period—should its
export revenues fall below 95 per cent
of their five-year moving average. Such
a yardstick embodies both price and
quantity crises. Its measurement can be
based on exogenous data, free from
manipulation. The optional right is equal
to the present value of five additional
years of grace from year 6 to 10. If the
country has no occasion to draw on it
during these years, or refrains from doing
so, the right is capitalised and the length
of this additional grace period thus
increases. If the country never experiences
a shock, its rights for suspension are
redeemed in the form of a shortening
of the loan maturity.
The resumption of lending to post debt
relief HIPC countries bestows a heavy
responsibility onto lenders. As we have
argued, lending responsibly does not
entail no ODA lending. There are two
dimensions to this responsibility. First,
current ODA, consisting in outright
grants and concessional loans, is
unduly constrained because its rather
rudimentary instruments are not allowed
to benefit fully from innovation on
financial markets. Modernisation is called
for, but even with the current definition,
instruments can be modernised to better
fit the risk profile of potential borrowers,
thus responding to one of the reasons
for excessive debt build-up.
Second, there is a real coordination
problem between lenders and borrowers
if the risk of excessive debt is to be
properly managed. To assess solvency,
potential investors and debtors need
access to information about the existing
debt level and need a forum to share
that information, maintain collective
discipline, and provide for an orderly
mechanism to deal with incipient
crises. This is not easy, as was amply
demonstrated by the aborted debate
on a sovereign debt restructuring
mechanism. This is one further reason
for developing debt instruments that
internalise the risk of default, as
suggested above.
As for collective discipline, the Bretton
Woods institutions have developed a
debt sustainability framework that has the
potential to become a useful coordinating
instrument, but this requires willingness
from these institutions to act as
facilitators and coordinators, rather
than as non negotiable standard-setters,
and an ongoing effort to disseminate and
share the framework with all potential
lenders and borrowers. 
D. Cohen, P. Jacquet and H. Reisen: After
Gleneagles: What Role for Loans in ODA?
OECD Development Centre Policy Brief
No. 31, Paris: Organisation for Economic
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OECD countries invest more than
USD 100 billion per year to advance
wellbeing and eradicate poverty in
developing countries. If this official aid is
to do as much good as possible, it must
be used effectively—meaning very
different things depending on which
side of the aid fence you are on.
For recipient countries, it means allocating
resources to their development priorities.
For countries and organisations that
provide aid, it means allocating funds to
countries that need it most and are likely
to make best use of it. But the true test of
aid effectiveness is improvement in
people’s lives.
A layperson observing today’s aid industry
might be understandably baffled by the
sheer number of actors, funds and
programmes. The last time the OECD
counted, there were more than 200
bilateral and multilateral organisations
channelling official development
assistance. Many developing countries
We’re Working on it:
Development Partners’
Efforts for Effective Aid
Key policy recommendations
1. Developing countries need to deepen their ownership of the development process by engaging their citizens and parliaments more fully
in planning and assessing their development policies and programmes. They should also link their plans much more closely to their budgets
and results frameworks.
2. Donors need to support these efforts by making better use of partners’ national budgets to align their programmes with country priorities.
They also need to improve the transparency and predictability of aid flows by sharing timely and accurate information on intended and
actual disbursements with budget authorities.
3. Recipient countries need to take the lead in determining priority programmes of capacity development, especially those needed to
improve country systems. Donors can help by better co-ordinating their technical assistance with country priorities and fully involving
partners when commissioning technical assistance.
4. To further harmonisation, donors must reduce the transaction costs of delivering and managing aid, in particular by rationalising the
division of labour, increasing use of local harmonisation and alignment action plans; increasing use of programme-based approaches;
expanding reliance on delegated co-operation; reducing the number of project implementation units and better integrating them
into ministries; and increasing efforts on untying aid.
5. To promote managing for results, countries and donors should make greater use of performance assessment frameworks and more
cost-effective results-oriented reporting.  This, too, will require donors to invest further in capacity development and increase their
use of country results reporting systems.
6. To begin addressing mutual accountability commitments, countries and donors should clearly define a mutual action agenda and discuss
aid effectiveness progress and development results more explicitly at country level by using country dialogue mechanisms and developing
credible monitoring mechanisms where needed.
The 2005 Paris Declaration
on Aid Effectiveness is an
ambitious plan to reform
the system of aid delivery.
It rests on five pillars:
ownership, alignment,
harmonisation, managing
for results, and mutual
accountability.
Most aid agencies have
taken important steps
to implement the Paris
Declaration and field
missions have increased
their efforts to align and
harmonise programmes.
A monitoring survey
of progress shows that
partners and donors
still have a long road
ahead to meet their
joint commitments.
have more than 40 donors to more than
600 active projects, and may still not be
on track to achieve the Millennium
Development Goals.
More than 100 countries and donor
organisations recognised the imperative of
managing aid more rationally when they
endorsed the Paris Declaration on Aid
Effectiveness in 2005, an ambitious plan
to reform the system of aid delivery. The
Paris Declaration rests on five common-
sense tenets, that aid is more likely to
promote development when:
 Developing countries exercise
leadership over their development
policies and plans (ownership).
 Donors base their support on
countries’ development strategies
and systems (alignment).
 Donors coordinate and minimise the
cost of delivering aid (harmonisation).
 Donors and partner countries orient
their activities to achieve results
(managing for results).
by Jan Cedergren,
Ministry for Foreign Affairs,  Sweden;
Chair, DAC Working Party on
Aid EffectivenessPoverty In Focus   October 2007    27
 Donors and partners are accountable
to each other for these reforms
(mutual accountability).
A 2006 survey of 34 self-selected countries
and a comprehensive set of donor
organisations covering 37 per cent of aid
across the developing world shows that
partners and donors have a long road
ahead to meet their joint commitments.
The Paris Declaration has stimulated an
important dialogue at country level on
how to improve aid. Donor agencies have
made major efforts to implement it within
their organisations and communicate its
importance to their staff, and there has
been at least some implementation
activity in over 60 countries.
The quality of partner countries’ national
development plans or poverty reduction
strategies is one concrete measure of
country ownership. The survey findings
show that national development
strategies need substantial strengthening
if countries are to meet the 2010 target.
In 2005, only five countries met the
criteria for sound operational development
strategies. The most common failing was
weakness in the mechanisms linking
budget formulation and execution to
national plans, policy priorities and results.
Improving transparency and accountability
of the use of development resources is
also an important objective of the
Declaration. Strengthening the credibility
of the budget as a tool for governing the
allocation and use of development
resources—domestic and external—can
not only improve the alignment of donor
support, but also permit parliamentary
scrutiny of government policies on
development, which is key to deepening
ownership. The survey indicates for nearly
all countries that the credibility of
development budgets is undermined by
inaccuracies in the budget estimates
of aid flows.
The Paris Declaration encourages donors
to increasingly use strengthened country
systems for public finance management,
procurement, monitoring and evaluation
etc. so that partner countries are
empowered to develop institutions that
can implement and account for their
development policies and resource use
to citizens and parliaments.
On average, the survey shows, nearly 40
per cent of aid flows to the government
used country systems of public finance
management and procurement. The
degree to which donors rely on country
systems varies with the quality of the
systems and the existence of reform
programmes etc. Progress will depend
on greater understanding of the
development benefits and risks of using
these systems, and sustained and long-
term efforts to strengthen capacity.
Recipient countries need to take the
lead in defining capacity development
priorities, and donors should direct their
technical and other assistance to
implementing coordinated strategies.
A key aim of the aid effectiveness
agenda is harmonisation in order to
decrease the transaction costs of
delivering aid, reducing the burdens
of developing countries required to
manage multiple programmes and
different donor procedures.
The survey provides clear evidence
that the cost of managing aid is high for
partner countries. It can be expected to
increase further as the volume of aid is
scaled up, new donors become more
active and further special initiatives are
created. Donors will need to work hard to
reduce the transaction costs of delivering
and managing aid. They should give
special attention to: increasing
complementarity and rationalising
division of labour; making greater use
of local harmonisation and alignment
action plans, and of sector-wide and
programme-based approaches;
expanding use of delegated cooperation
and other innovative approaches; and
reducing the number of project
implementation units and better
integrating them into ministries.
The management for development results
tenet calls for donors and partner
countries to focus on achieving results,
and using information on results to
improve decision making and
programme performance.
The survey suggests that translating
evidence on results into processes of
policy reform remains a major challenge
in the large majority of surveyed
countries. Countries and donors should
use performance assessment
frameworks and more cost-effective
results-oriented reporting. This, too,
will require donors to invest in capacity
development and rely more on country
results reporting systems.
Mutual accountability is important for better
aid management, and also for informing
the respective publics of the use of
resources to achieve development results.
The survey shows that the work to
establish specific mechanisms for joint
monitoring of aid effectiveness
commitments at country level is just
beginning, and more efforts will be
needed to achieve the target by 2010. Aid
effectiveness issues and results need to be
discussed more explicitly at country level,
and credible monitoring mechanisms
need to be developed.
Most development agencies
have taken important steps to
advance implementation of the
Paris Declaration and field missions
have increased their local efforts to
align and harmonise their programmes.
Nevertheless, the survey suggests that a
number of hurdles work against donors’
ability to meet the commitments.
For example, in many agencies the Paris
Declaration is still principally owned by
policy staff at headquarters, while at
country level harmonisation tasks are
sometimes seen as getting in the way of
efforts to achieve tangible development
results. Incentive structures still imply
pressure to commit and disburse funds.
Limited flexibility for staff to devote time
to coordination and high staff turnover
also reinforce short term perspectives.
The High Level Meeting in Accra in
September 2008 will take stock of
advances made and remaining
challenges. It will not be a smooth ride
ahead. But every step forward, realised
at country level, will be important in
creating a more effective development
cooperation framework that can lift
more people out of poverty.
OECD/DCD: 2006 Survey on Monitoring




SBS – Ed. BNDES, 10º andar




Telephone   +55 61 2105 5000
O
c
t
o
b
e
r
 
 
2
0
0
7